-
Epic
-
Resolution: Unresolved
-
Major
-
None
-
None
-
None
-
rhos-conplat-observability - RHOSO PQC Cryptography Analysis
-
False
-
-
False
-
-
Not Selected
-
?
-
?
-
To Do
-
?
-
rhos-conplat-observability
-
?
-
-
-
Objective: Perform a deep-dive analysis of the Component Name codebase to identify cryptographic operations (TLS, encryption, signing, key management) requiring updates for quantum-safe algorithms (ML-KEM/ML-DSA).
Scope of Analysis:
- Go-based services: Map dependencies against OCP 4.20/4.22+ crypto libraries.
- Python/Dataplane: Assess RHEL 9.7+/10.1+ PQC compatibility.
- TLS 1.3: Confirm the service can run without TLS 1.2 hardcoding.
- Cryptographic modules: list all cryptographic modules used in the Component Name codebase (separating test code from product code), with their current/planned PQC support (if information exists).
Timebox: If the analysis reveals high complexity, a follow-up implementation Jira should be created which should be a RHOSO 19 Beta target (likely TBD-PO).
Acceptance Criteria
- Categorized Crypto Inventory: All cryptographic calls (signing, hashing, encryption) within Component Name are identified and categorized as Symmetric or Asymmetric.
- Legacy Mapping: A map exists of all current RSA/ECDSA/ECC usage that requires replacement or supplementation by ML-KEM or ML-DSA.
- TLS 1.3 Verification: Confirmed that Component Name communication logic has no hardcoded dependencies on TLS 1.2.
All cryptographic modules: The codebase has been scanned for all cryptographic modules and the status of PQC support for each used module is provided. If a module is unused, deprecation should be planned. - AI-Driven Audit: The codebase has been scanned using AI analysis, and "false positives" have been filtered out.
Bottleneck Identification: Documented any component-specific performance concerns (e.g., increased latency due to PQC key sizes)
Definition of Done
- Documentation: Findings are logged in the central PQC Support Tracking Doc.
- Actionability: Follow-up Implementation Jiras are created for any required code changes and linked to this spike.
- Risk Log: Any risks (e.g., performance hits in Keystone) are added to the component risk assessment.
- Peer Review: Findings have been reviewed and signed off by the Security DFG.
Follow the PQC Program Status dashboard to check any duplication of common-library or some work already in progress.