Description of problem (please be detailed as possible and provide log
snippests):

Protect pod default service account tokens from compromise by minimizing the mounting of the default service account token to only those pods whose application requires interaction with the Kubernetes API.

By default, Kubernetes automatically provisions a service account for each pod and mounts the secret at runtime. This service account is not typically used. If this pod is compromised and the compromised user has access to the service account, the service account could be used to escalate privileges within the cluster. To reduce the likelihood of privilege escalation this service account should not be mounted by default unless the pod requires direct access to the Kubernetes API as part of the pods functionality.

Version of all relevant components (if applicable):

Does this issue impact your ability to continue to work with the product
(please explain in detail what is the user impact)?

Is there any workaround available to the best of your knowledge?

Rate from 1 - 5 the complexity of the scenario you performed that caused this
bug (1 - very simple, 5 - very complex)?

Can this issue reproducible?

Can this issue reproduce from the UI?

If this is a regression, please provide more details to justify this:

Steps to Reproduce:
1.
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Actual results:

Expected results:

Additional info:
Add `automountServiceAccountToken: false` or a value distinct from 'default' for the `serviceAccountName` key to the deployment's Pod configuration.