Vulnerability Details

CWE Type(s): CWE-22 (Path Traversal)
Severity: MEDIUM
Team: PyTorch Compile

Location

• File: benchmarks/dynamo/common.py
• Lines: 4210

Description

Path Traversal vulnerability in output filename construction. The code uses os.path.join with user-controlled args.output without validation, allowing directory traversal via ../ sequences. Users can specify output paths like "../../etc/passwd" to write benchmark results to arbitrary filesystem locations.

Impact

• Write benchmark output files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem
• Overwrite system configuration files or sensitive data
• Bypass intended output directory restrictions
• Potential for persistence via writing to startup directories

Root Cause

The code at line 4210 uses os.path.join with user-controlled args.output and args.output_directory without validation. No checks prevent path traversal sequences (..) or validation that resolved paths stay within the intended directory.

Fix Status

MR Link: https://gitlab.com/redhat/rhel-ai/team-pytorch/pytorch/-/merge_requests/178
Fix Branch: security-fix-Command_Injection-cwe22_common_path_traversal
Status: IMPLEMENTED

Fix Implementation:
1. Use os.path.basename(output_filename) to remove any directory components from user input
2. Use os.path.abspath() to resolve final path
3. Verify resolved path starts with base directory using startswith(base_dir + os.sep)
4. Raise ValueError if path escapes the intended directory

This prevents both relative (../) and absolute (/etc/passwd) path traversal attacks.

Related Exploit Files

• test_cwe22_common_path_traversal.py

Exploit Code Sample

# VULNERABLE CODE (line 4210):
if output_filename:
    if args.output_directory:
        output_filename = os.path.join(args.output_directory, output_filename)
    else:
        output_filename = os.path.join(
            torch._dynamo.config.base_dir, output_filename
        )

# ATTACK VECTOR:
# args.output = "../../../etc/passwd"
# Results in writing to: /etc/passwd instead of intended benchmark directory

# SAFE FIX:
output_filename = os.path.basename(output_filename)  # Remove directory components
if args.output_directory:
    base_dir = os.path.abspath(args.output_directory)
    output_filename = os.path.join(base_dir, output_filename)
    if not os.path.abspath(output_filename).startswith(base_dir + os.sep):
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid output path: {output_filename} escapes directory")

References

• CWE Reference: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
• CVE Table: /pytorch_workspace/Security_related_files/Security_related_files/Command_Injection/Command_Injection_part_005/results/cve_analyzed_report.csv

Generated by CI Security Bot on 2026-02-04