

# OPENSIFT 4 & PCI-DSS

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Red Hat, Cloud Platforms

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# What makes an effective hybrid cloud platform?

**BROAD ECOSYSTEM**


**BROADEST APPLICATION  
SUPPORT**

**DEVELOPER EXPERIENCE &  
ON-DEMAND**

**AUTOMATED OPERATIONS**

**STANDARDS, PORTABILITY  
& INTEROPERABILITY**

**SECURITY & COMPLIANCE**



**Edge**



**Datacenter**




**Public Cloud**



**Multi-Cloud**

# Security must be continuous

## And integrated throughout the IT lifecycle



# Enterprise Kubernetes from Red Hat

Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes

## Multicluster management

Observability : Discovery : Policy : Compliance : Configuration : Workloads

Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes

## Advanced security

Declarative security : Vulnerability management : Network segmentation : Threat detection & response

OpenShift Container Platform



OpenShift Kubernetes Engine

Manage workloads

Build cloud-native apps

Data-driven insights

Developer productivity

### Platform services

Service mesh : Serverless  
Builds : CI/CD pipelines  
Log management  
Cost management

### Application services

Languages & runtimes  
API management  
Integration  
Messaging  
Process Automation

### Data services

Databases : Cache  
Data ingest & prep  
Data analytics : AI/ML  
Data mgmt & resilience

### Developer services

Developer CLI : IDE  
Plugins & extensions  
CodeReady Workspaces  
CodeReady Containers

## Kubernetes cluster services

Automated Ops : Over-the-air updates : Monitoring : Logging : Registry : Networking : Router : Virtualization : OLM : Helm

## Kubernetes (orchestration)

## Linux (container host OS)



Physical



Virtual



Private cloud



Public cloud



Managed cloud  
(Azure, AWS, GCP, IBM, Red Hat)



Edge



# Red Hat delivers continuous security for containers and Kubernetes



## DETECT

Trusted Content

Container Registry

Build Management

CI/CD Pipeline



## PROTECT

Kubernetes Platform Lifecycle

Identity and Access  
Management

Platform Data

Deployment Policies



## RESPOND

Container Isolation

Network Isolation

Application Access & Data

Observability

**BUILD**

**DEPLOY**

**RUN**

**DEV**

**OPS**

# Hardening, applicability guides, certifications

## OpenShift 4

- Available now
  - [HIPAA](#)
  - [ISO 27001](#) (ask RH for a copy)
  - [FISMA](#)
  - [The OpenShift Security Guide](#)
  - [OpenShift 4 Hardening Guide](#) (ask RH for a copy)
  - PCI-DSS
- Target Q2 CY 2021
  - CIS OpenShift Benchmark
  - HITRUST

## Managed Services certifications

- SOC2-type 1, SOC2-type 2
  - OpenShift Dedicated (OSD) on AWS
  - ARO, IBM ROKS, ROSA
  - In process for OSD on GCP
- ISO-27001
  - OSD on AWS, ARO
- PCI-DSS
  - ARO, IBM ROKS
  - In process for OSD on AWS and GCP, ROSA
- FedRAMP
  - ARO, IBM ROKS
  - In process for OSD on AWS, ROSA
- HIPAA and/or HITRUST
  - ARO, IBM ROKS
  - In discussion for OSD and ROSA

# OpenShift Container Platform

## Automated management of the entire infrastructure

Discovery : Policy : Compliance : Configuration : Workloads

### Full Stack Automation

The operating system is managed as part of the cluster, autoscaling of cloud resources

Service Mesh : Service Catalog : Container Native Virtualization

### RHEL CoreOS

Container optimized OS with reduced attack surface, read-only user space, transactional updates

### Application Services

Builds : Pipelines : Business : Integration : CI/CD : DevOps Services

### Developer Productivity

### Automated Operations

Full-stack Automation : RHEL CoreOS : Smarter Upgrades : SDN : Monitoring : Security and Compliance

### Cluster Services

Automated Ops : Over-Time Updates : Monitoring : Logging : Registry : Networking : Router

Operate Kubernetes

### Smarter Updates

No downtime for well behaving apps, maintenance window for the entire cluster

### Network isolation

Integrated cluster ingress, egress controls. Network isolation via OVN/OVS SDN and Kubernetes network policies

### Monitoring, Logging, Audit

Cluster monitoring and audit on by default, optional logging stack with log forwarding

### Security and Compliance


IAM, RBAC, certificate and secrets management, Security Context Constraints. Container Security operator, Compliance operator



# OpenShift Platform Services


## Platform Services to manage workloads and tie them into OpenShift infra capabilities

Discovery | Policy | Compliance | Configuration | Workloads






# PCI-DSS RECOMMENDATIONS



# Coalfire Product Applicability Guide & Reference Architecture

- Red Hat contracted with [Coalfire](#) to provide a PCI-DSS technical controls product applicability guide (PCI-DSS 3.2) and reference architecture (PCI-DSS 3.2.1) for OpenShift\*
- Technical requirements 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 are applicable, discussed




# Coalfire conclusion

“OpenShift hosted on Red Hat Enterprise Linux, as reviewed by Coalfire, can be effective in providing support for the outlined objectives and requirements of PCI DSS v3.2.1. Through proper implementation and integration into the organization’s overall technical infrastructure and information management systems, OpenShift may be useable in a PCI DSS v3.2.1 controlled environment.”

# Securing the container platform

- Configuration and lifecycle management
- Host & runtime security
- Identity and Access Management
  - Project namespaces
  - Role Based Access Controls
- Data at rest, data in transit
  - Ingress & egress controls
  - Encryption
- Logging, Monitoring, Metrics
- Audit and Compliance



# Automated Configuration and Lifecycle Management

## Dramatically simplified for the Hybrid Cloud



### Machines

Machines are complex for ops



Make machines easy  
(like containers)



### Configuration

Config change is risky



Make config management  
and config change  
easy and safe



### Lifecycle

Software lifecycle is hard



Automate software  
lifecycle on Kube

# Automated Container Operations

FULLY AUTOMATED DAY-1 AND DAY-2 OPERATIONS

INSTALL	DEPLOY	HARDEN	OPERATE
<b>AUTOMATED OPERATIONS</b>			
Infra provisioning	Full-stack deployment	Secure defaults	Multicluster aware
Embedded OS	On-premises and cloud	Network isolation	Monitoring and alerts
	Unified experience	Audit and logs	Full-stack patch & upgrade
		Signing and policies	Zero-downtime upgrades
			Vulnerability scanning

# The Value Of Kubernetes Operators

No need for operator

Requires custom Operator built with SDK



Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

Phase IV

Phase V

## Installation

Automated application provisioning and configuration management

## Upgrades

Patch and minor version upgrades supported

## Lifecycle

App lifecycle, storage lifecycle (backup, failure recovery)

## Deep Insights

Metrics, alerts, log processing and workload analysis

## Auto-pilot

Horizontal/vertical scaling, auto config tuning, abnormal detection, scheduling tuning...




ANSIBLE



# REQUIREMENT 1


Install & maintain a firewall  
configuration






# Requirement 1: Install & maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data

“Requirement 1 is primarily concerned with traditional edge protections between the Internet or “untrusted networks” and internal networks. It is recommended that the OpenShift environment be placed in an internal controlled network that is protected with traditional edge protections provided by third-party solutions. ***As such, Coalfire determined that most, if not all, of these requirements were not pertinent to OpenShift’s capabilities. However, assessors often look at implementation of firewalls and routers on internal networks used to isolate or segment workloads as a method of reducing assessment scope. With this in mind, many of the requirements may apply to the internal network elements that perform segmentation, including the SDN elements provided by OpenShift.***”




## Requirement 1 Applicability

- Protect with “traditional edge protections provided by third party solutions.”
- Use the available SDN network policies to provide micro-segmentation and isolation of workloads
- Use ingress and network policy objects to restrict inbound traffic
- OpenShift provides the ability to separate workloads onto different servers (nodes)
- Similarly, infrastructure pods (ingress and egress router) can be hosted on separate nodes from the master
- Use egress to restrict outbound traffic




# OpenShift networking

- Built-in internal DNS to reach services by name
- Software Defined Networking (SDN) for a unified cluster network to enable pod-to-pod communication
- OpenShift follows the Kubernetes Container Networking Interface (CNI) plug-in model
- Isolate applications from other applications within a cluster
- Isolate environments (Dev / Test / Prod) from other environments within a cluster



# External Access to Cluster Resources




Ingress Traffic

- Two primary entry points into OpenShift
  - API
  - Ingress/Router
- Proper DNS entries must be configured
- Additional ingress types available
  - NodePort (requires additional port resources)
  - LoadBalancer

# OpenShift cluster with multiple zones

Using multiple ingress controllers, network policies, multiple egress pods



Application pods run on one OpenShift Cluster.


Microsegmented with Network Security policies.

Infra Nodes in each zone run Ingress and Egress pods for specific zones.

If required, physical isolation of pods to specific nodes is possible with node-selectors. But that can reduce worker node density.

# OpenShift SDN

## Network policy enabled by default




### Example Policies

- Allow all traffic inside the project
- Allow traffic from green to gray
- Allow traffic to purple on 8080

```
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: allow-to-purple-on-8080
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      color: purple
  ingress:
  - ports:
    - protocol: tcp
      port: 8080
```


# Controlling Egress Traffic

Egress IP high availability (multiple IPs)



# Controlling Egress Traffic

Egress IP high availability (multiple IPs)





# Egress firewall to limit access

to external addresses accessed by some or all pods from within the cluster


## Examples:

A pod can talk to hosts (outside OpenShift cluster) but cannot connect to public internet

A pod can talk to public internet, but cannot connect to hosts (outside OpenShift cluster)


Public Internet

A pod cannot reach specific subnets/hosts



# REQUIREMENT 2

## Vendor Standards and Configs



# Requirement 2

## Vendor defaults & configuration standards

2.1 Always change vendor-supplied defaults and remove or disable unnecessary default accounts

2.2 Develop config standards for all components


2.2.2 Enable only necessary services, protocols, daemons, etc., as required for the function of the system

2.2.3 Implement additional security features as required. For example, encryption

2.2.4 Configure system security parameters to prevent misuse


2.2.5 Remove all unnecessary functionality

2.3 Encrypt all non-console administrative access



## Requirement 2 Applicability

- No vendor provided default passwords are in use
- Configure an external identity provider, create your own cluster admin, remove kubeadmin user
- By default, RHEL CoreOS is a container-optimized OS and includes only the components needed to run OpenShift 4
- Encrypt RHEL CoreOS volumes
- Encrypt the etcd datastore
- By default, all communication between the control plane and the data plane is encrypted
- Install the Compliance operator (requires 4.6)




# Container host vision

An Ideal Container Host would be	RHEL CoreOS
Minimal	Only what's needed to run containers
Secure	Read-only & locked down
Immutable	Immutable image-based deployments & updates
Always up-to-date	OS updates are automated and transparent
Updates never break my apps	Isolates all applications as containers
Updates never break my cluster	OS components are compatible with the cluster
Supported on my infra of choice	Inherits majority of the RHEL ecosystem
Simple to configure	Installer generated configuration
Effortless to manage	Managed by Kubernetes Operators

# Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS

## The Immutable Container Optimized Operating System



### Role in OpenShift Ecosystem

- Versioned and validated for specific OpenShift version
- Required for masters. RHEL option for workers
- User space read-only

### Managed by the OpenShift Cluster

- Considered a member of an OpenShift Deployment
- Configuration managed by the Machine Config Operator
  - Container runtime
  - Kubelet configuration
  - Authorized container registries
  - SSH Configuration



# cri-o

A lightweight, OCI-compliant container runtime

Optimized for  
Kubernetes

Any OCI-compliant  
container from any  
OCI registry  
(including docker)

Improve Security and  
Performance at scale

[CRI - the Container Runtime Interface](#)

[OpenShift 4 defaults to CRI-O](#)

[Red Hat contributes CRI-O to the Cloud Native Computing Foundation](#)

# Key characteristics of RHEL CoreOS

- **Transactional updates** - RHCOS is distributed as an image and each operating system update is versioned and distributed as containers. Major releases (and some z stream releases) provide new boot images. The OS always boots into a known-good version; this is similar in principle to how container images are managed and deployed.
- **Immutable management** - RHCOS is built to be managed in an immutable fashion by the Machine Config Operator and Kubernetes API. While certain parts of the OS are truly immutable, others are not. Immutable management enables us to spawn new nodes and ensure that the cluster is the single source of truth for provisioning configurations, OS versions, and run-time configuration. Apart from consistency, this also enables elastic clusters to spawn and destroy nodes.



# Key characteristics of RHEL CoreOS (cont'd)

- **Applications need to run in containers** - Installing RPMs on RHCOS is not supported. The OS is built to run all processes outside the OS as a container. This allows us to guarantee successful upgrades and automation beyond what a traditional operating system can deliver.
- **rpm-ostree** - This is the technology used to assemble the operating system. RHEL RPMs are used to create the OS images, and versions can easily be queried using the rpm command.
  - **/usr** is where the operating system binaries and libraries are stored and is read-only.
  - **/etc, /boot, /var** are writable on the system but only intended to be altered by the Machine Config Operator.
  - **/var/lib/containers** is the graph storage location for storing container images.

# RHEL CoreOS management


- **Regular management** of the underlying RHCOS cluster nodes is designed to be performed via the OpenShift API itself.
- **The only users** that exist on an RHCOS OpenShift node are *root* and *core*.
  - A user named *core* is created, with your ssh key assigned to that user. This allows you to log in to the cluster with that user name and your credentials.
  - The *core* user has permission to run privileged commands.
  - Adding additional users at the node level is highly discouraged.
  - **Updates are managed through the OpenShift MachineConfigOperator**
  - OS upgrades are delivered as an atomic unit.
  - The new OS deployment is staged during upgrades and goes into effect on the next reboot.
  - RHCOS upgrades in OpenShift Container Platform are performed during cluster updates.

# OpenShift Cluster Management

- OpenShift Container Platform **creates the kubeadmin user** after the installation process completes.
- The **kubeadmin user has the cluster-admin role automatically applied** and is treated as the root user for the cluster. The password is dynamically generated and unique to your OpenShift Container Platform environment. After installation completes the password is provided in the installation program's output.
- **After you define an identity provider and create a new cluster-admin user, you can remove the kubeadmin to improve cluster security.**
- Cluster configuration changes are managed through cluster operators.


# Encrypted control plane communication

- Certificates are used to provide secure connections to
  - master and nodes
  - Ingress controller and registry
  - etcd
- Certificate rotation is automated
- Optionally configure external endpoints to use custom certificates
- For example:  
[Requesting and Installing Let's Encrypt Certificates for OpenShift 4](#)



# Encrypt secrets in transit and at rest

- Secure mechanism for holding sensitive data, such as
  - Passwords and credentials
  - SSH Keys
  - Certificates
- Secrets are made available as
  - Environment variables
  - Volume mounts
  - Interaction with external systems (e.g. vaults)
- Encrypted in transit and at rest
  - Encrypt the etcd datastore
  - Encrypt RHCOS volumes
- Never rest on the nodes




# Volume Encryption

## Network Bound Disk Encryption

- Provides encryption for local storage
- Addresses disk/image theft
- Platform/cloud agnostic implementation
- TPM/vTPM (v2) and Tang endpoints for automatic decryption




# Openshift Compliance Operator: Declarative Security Compliance



# RECOMMENDATION 2

## Protect against malware






# Requirement 5

Protect all systems against malware and regularly update anti-virus software or programs



# Requirement 5: Considerations & Recommendations

- Look for a malware and/or anti-virus solution that is designed to work with containers or container images.
- Deploy the container security operator
- Use Security Context Constraints
  - Containers cannot run as root by default
- Monitor for deprecated nodes
- Deploy the file integrity operator
- Container runtime security solutions (behavioral analysis) are available from Red Hat partners such as Aqua Security, Neuvector, Palo Alto (Twistlock), Sysdig



# RHCOS & anti-virus scanners

- Solutions, such as anti-virus scanners, can be deployed as daemonsets or container images. However, few, if any anti-virus vendors are delivering their software in this form.
- We recommend talking with your anti-virus vendor and asking what solutions they have available for a container-optimized OS.
- It's still RHEL
  - To see the **packages installed**, run the same commands as on a RHEL system:  
``rpm -qa |sort``
  - To see which **ports are in use**: ``ss -tulpn``
- However, in a 2019 paper from Gartner on Cloud Workload Protection Platforms, recommends that clients ["Replace antivirus \(AV\)-centric strategies with a "zero-trust execution"/default deny/application control approach to workload protection where possible, even if used only in detection mode."](#)<sup>1</sup>

# View Security Vulnerabilities with the Quay Operator

## See all your Container Vulnerabilities right from the Console Dashboard


- Link out to **Red Hat Quay** for more in depth information
- The Quay Operator supports both **On-premise and External** Quay Registries
- Currently uses **Clair for Security Scan**; Planning to expand to other Vendors( TwistLock, Aqua, e.g. )
- *Only works for images managed by Quay*

The screenshot displays the Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform console. The main dashboard shows the 'ImageSecurity' status with 1 vulnerability. A 'Security breakdown' modal is open, showing a pie chart for '1 total' vulnerability and a list of 'Fixable Vulnerabilities' including 'openssl-lib' in '1 namespaces'. Below the modal, a 'Quay Security Scanner' summary shows 61 vulnerabilities detected, with 14 high-level, 33 medium-level, and 14 low-level vulnerabilities. A table of vulnerabilities is visible at the bottom.

CVE	SEVERITY	PACKAGE	CURRENT VERSION	FIXED IN VERSION	INTRODUCED IN LAYER
RHSA-2019-0710	High	python-lib	2.7.5-48.el7	0.2.7.5-37.el7_6	
RHSA-2019-1587	High	python-lib	2.7.5-48.el7	0.2.7.5-40.el7_6	
RHSA-2019-0368	High	systemd-lib	219-57.el7	0.219-42.el7_6.5	
RHSA-2019-0049	High	systemd-lib	219-57.el7	0.219-42.el7_6.2	
RHSA-2019-0679	High	libssh2	1.4.3-10.el7_2.1	0.1.4.3-12.el7_6.2	
RHSA-2019-2285	High	yum-plugin-ovf	1.1.31-45.el7	0.1.1.31-46.el7_5	

# Container security starts with Linux security

- Security in the RHEL host applies to the container
- RHEL enables container multitenancy
- SELINUX and Kernel Namespaces are the one-two punch no one can beat
- Protects not only the host, but containers from each other
- RHEL CoreOS provides minimized attack surface



# SELinux mitigates container runtime vulnerabilities

## SELinux Mitigates container Vulnerability

January 13, 2017 | Joe Brockmeier

[< Back to all posts](#)

Tags

A new CVE, ([CVE-2016-9962](#)), for the docker container runtime and runc were recently released. Fixed packages are being prepared and shipped for RHEL as well as Fedora and CentOS. This CVE reports that if you `exec` d into a running container, the process inside the container could attack the process that just entered the container.

<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/selinux-mitigates-container-vulnerability>

## Latest container exploit (runc) can be blocked by SELinux

February 28, 2019 | Dan Walsh

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Tags: [Security](#), [Containers](#)

A flaw in runc ([CVE-2019-5736](#)), announced last week, allows container processes to "escape" their containment and execute programs on the host operating system. The good news is that well-configured SELinux can stop it.

<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/latest-container-exploit-runc-can-be-blocked-selinux>

# Runtime security policies

([Pod Security Policies](#) / [Security Context Constraints](#))

```
-zsh 1361
$ oc describe scc restricted
Name:                restricted
Priority:             <none>
Access:
  Users:             <none>
  Groups:           system:authenticated
Settings:
  Allow Privileged:  false
  Allow Privilege Escalation: true
  Default Add Capabilities: <none>
  Required Drop Capabilities: KILL,MKNOD,SETUID,SETGID
  Allowed Capabilities: <none>
  Allowed Seccomp Profiles: <none>
  Allowed Volume Types: configMap,downwardAPI,emptyDir
  Allowed Flexvolumes: <all>
  Allowed Unsafe Sysctls: <none>
  Forbidden Sysctls: <none>
  Allow Host Network: false
  Allow Host Ports:  false
  Allow Host PID:    false
  Allow Host IPC:    false
  Read Only Root Filesystem: false
  SELinux Context Strategy: MustRunAs
```

Allow administrators to control permissions for pods

By default, ensure no containers can run as root

Admin can grant access to privileged PSP / SCC


8 included. Custom SCCs can be created

# File Integrity

- [Secure Boot](#) - provides guarantee that a trusted, unmodified Kernel is loaded
- File integrity monitoring
  - /usr is read only
  - Machine Config Operator marks nodes with wrongly configured files as degraded
- Optional OpenShift File Integrity Operator using [AIDE](#)
  - Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment is a utility that creates a database of files on the system, and then uses that database to ensure file integrity and detect system intrusions




# Red Hat OpenShift certified operators – Security



# REQUIREMENT 6

Develop and maintain secure applications




# Requirement 6: Develop & Maintain Secure Applications

6.1 Establish a process to identify security vulnerabilities


6.2 Ensure that all system components and software are protected by applying applicable vendor-supplied patches

6.4 Follow change control policies for all changes to system components (GitOps)



## Requirement 6 Applicability

- “Immutable containers are containers that will never be changed while running.”
- The best practice for patching containerized applications is to rebuild the container image and redeploy from the image.
- Separate development, test and production deployments with OpenShift projects and deploy to separate hosts if appropriate (node-selector)
- Deploy OpenShift Service Mesh to encrypt service to service communication and add protection for application ingress and egress
- Keep up with OpenShift z stream releases




# Securing Containerized Applications

## An opportunity to shift security left


### Best practices

- Use trusted sources for external content
- Use a private registry to manage images
- CI/CD must have security gates
- Application secrets management
- Apply runtime security policies
- Rebuild and redeploy - never patch a running container
- Ensure application logging, monitoring




# Secure & Automate The Content Lifecycle

Elements of the Openshift container pipeline



# Trust is temporal: rebuild and redeploy as needed




[Track updates & simplify management with ImageStreams](#)

Use [Image Change Triggers](#) to automatically rebuild custom images with updated (patched) external images

# External Content: Use Trusted Sources

## Red Hat Container Images

- Signed Images
- Health Index (A to F grade)\*
- Security advisories & errata (patches)




The screenshot shows the Red Hat Container Catalog interface for the 'python' image. The page title is 'Red Hat Container Catalog' with a search bar containing 'python'. The main content area displays the image name 'rhscsl/python-36-rhel7' and a description: 'Python 3.6 platform for building and running applications by Red Hat, Inc. | in Product Red Hat Enterprise Linux'. Below the description are tabs for 'Overview', 'Get This Image', 'Tech Details', 'Support', and 'Tags'. The 'Overview' tab is active, showing a 'Description' section with text about Python 3.6 as a container base platform. To the right, there is a 'Most recent tag' section showing 'Updated 6 days ago' and '1-55'. Below that is a 'Health Index' section with a green bar and the letter 'A'. At the bottom, there is a 'Repository Specifications' table with columns for 'Registry' (registry.redhat.io) and 'Namespace/Repository' (rhscsl/python-36-rhel7). A 'Screenshot' button is visible next to the repository name.

Registry	Namespace/Repository
registry.redhat.io	rhscsl/python-36-rhel7



# The Red Hat Universal Base Image

The base image for all your needs -- enterprise architecture, security and performance



The Red Hat Universal Base Image is based on RHEL and made available at no charge by a new end user license agreement.

## Development


- Minimal footprint (~90 to ~200MB)
- Programming languages (Modularity & AppStreams)
- Enables a single CI/CD chain

## Production


- Supported as RHEL when running on RHEL
- Same Performance, Security & Life cycle as RHEL
- Can attach RHEL support subscriptions as RHEL

# Supportability matrix


Red Hat Support and Community Support



Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7



Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8



Like any upstream project

# Red Hat Quay Enterprise Container Registry

- Offered as self-managed and as-a-service
- Vulnerability Scanning (Clair)
- Geographic Replication
- Build Image Triggers
- Image Rollback with Time Machine

The screenshot displays the Red Hat Quay interface for a container image. At the top, the navigation bar includes 'RED HAT QUAY', 'EXPLORE', 'REPOSITORIES', and 'TUTORIAL'. A search bar and user profile icon are also present. The main content area shows the image path 'example/python' and the image ID '3f86e14b88f9'. A donut chart indicates that 718 vulnerabilities were detected, with 144 patches available. The chart is divided into four segments: 37% (grey), 31% (orange), 25% (yellow), and 7% (red). A summary table lists the vulnerability counts by severity level: 47 High-level, 220 Medium-level, 177 Low-level, 266 Negligible-level, and 8 Unknown-level vulnerabilities. Below this, a table titled 'Vulnerabilities' shows a list of 144 vulnerabilities, including CVE IDs, severity scores, package names, current and fixed versions, and the layer they were introduced in.

RED HAT QUAY EXPLORE REPOSITORIES TUTORIAL search + - bell opeptic...

example/python 3f86e14b88f9

Quay Security Scanner has detected 718 vulnerabilities.  
Patches are available for 144 vulnerabilities.

- 47 High-level vulnerabilities.
- 220 Medium-level vulnerabilities.
- 177 Low-level vulnerabilities.
- 266 Negligible-level vulnerabilities.
- 8 Unknown-level vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities Showing 144 of 718 Vulnerabilities Filter Vulnerabilities...  Only show fixable


CVE	SEVERITY ↓	PACKAGE	CURRENT VERSION	FIXED IN VERSION	INTRODUCED IN LAYER
CVE-2018-15686	10 / 10	systemd	232-25+deb9u6	232-25+deb9u10	file:a61c14b18252183a4719980da97ac483044bca...
CVE-2019-3855	9.3 / 10	libssh2	1.7.0-1	1.7.0-1+deb9u1	apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-i...
CVE-2019-3462	9.3 / 10	apt	1.4.8	1.4.9	file:a61c14b18252183a4719980da97ac483044bca...
CVE-2017-16997	9.3 / 10	glibc	2.24-11+deb9u3	2.24-11+deb9u4	file:a61c14b18252183a4719980da97ac483044bca...

# Integrate Security in your CI/CD Pipeline

**Automated quality and security: because you can't inspect quality into a product**

Automatically prohibit untrusted containers via Openshift policy

Trusted repos



[Red Hat Container Catalog: Java Applications](#)  
[More about the Container Health Index](#)

# Enhancing Secure Application Development and DevSecOps

“Shift Left” - find CVEs and license issues during development

Red Hat Dependency Analytics IDE plugins provide security and license warnings for any project dependency:

- Be notified of CVEs in any package or sub-package
- Remediation advice (upgrade / downgrade)
- Uses open source and Snyk CVE databases
- Supported for Java, Node, Python

The screenshot displays the IDE interface with a sidebar on the left showing a file explorer and a main panel on the right showing a 'Dependency Analytics Report' for 'requirements.txt'. The report is divided into several sections:

- Security Issues:** A card with a red warning icon indicating 3 total issues found. It shows a 'Highest CVSS Score' of 7.5 / 10 with a red progress bar and 'No. of dependencies with this CVSS Score: 2'.
- Licenses:** A card with an orange warning icon. It lists 'Suggested License' as 'None', 'License Conflicts' as 0, 'Unknown Licenses' as 3, and 'Restrictive Licenses' as 0.

Below the report, there is a section titled 'Dependencies with security issues in your stack' which includes a table of dependencies:


#	Dependencies	No. of CVE(s)	Highest CVSS Score
1	pyyaml	1	7.5/10

# Jenkins CI/CD, run in OpenShift and deploy to OpenShift

Jenkins is still the most used CI/CD platform in enterprises and can be used from inside OpenShift.

An intuitive pipeline visualization makes it simple for users to see how builds are progressing.

The full Jenkins UI is also available.



The screenshot displays the Jenkins web interface for a pipeline named 'tasks-pipeline-1'. On the left is a dark sidebar with navigation options: Workloads, Networking, Storage, Builds (selected), Build Configs, Image Streams, Monitoring, Compute, and Administration. The main content area shows the 'Build Details' for 'tasks-pipeline-1' with tabs for Overview, YAML, Environment, Logs, and Events. The 'Overview' tab is active, showing a 'Build Overview' section with a horizontal pipeline visualization. The pipeline consists of six stages: 'Build App' (6 minutes ago), 'Test' (5 minutes ago), 'Code Analysis' (5 minutes ago), 'Archive App' (5 minutes ago), 'Build Image' (5 minutes ago), and 'Deploy DEV' (2 minutes ago). Each stage is marked with a green checkmark. Below the pipeline, there is a 'Build 1' entry (8 minutes ago) with a 'View Logs' link, and a 'Promote to ST...' entry (2 minutes ago) with an 'Input Required' link. At the bottom, a table provides metadata: NAME (tasks-pipeline-1), STATUS (Running), NAMESPACE (cicd-smx), and TYPE (JenkinsPipeline).

**Why?** Build in, or for, OpenShift from your enterprise CI/CD system.

# OpenShift Pipelines: A Kubernetes-native CI/CD platform

Provides a next-gen Kubernetes CI/CD pipeline that works for containers (including serverless).

Based on the Tekton project (which was spun out of the Knative Pipelines project) started by Google, Red Hat and others.

Target general availability in OpenShift 4.7.

The screenshot shows the OpenShift Pipelines console interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with the Red Hat OpenShift logo and the user 'Administrator'. Below that, the page title is 'XYZ Name' and the project is 'Default'. A filter bar shows 2 items. The main table lists pipeline runs, with 'aa-build-3' in a 'Running' state, started 10 mins ago, with a duration of 2 min 04 sec, triggered by 'Commit #123456ABC'. Below the table, a pipeline graph shows the execution flow: 'Input Info' leads to 'build-name (30s)', which then branches into 'Test-st... (6s)' and 'Code a... (13s)'. 'Test-st...' leads to 'Security... (20s)', and 'Code a...' leads to 'Image b... (0s)'. Both 'Security...' and 'Image b...' lead to 'DeployTo... (0s)'. A terminal window at the bottom shows the output of the 'build-name' step, including package installation and a successful 'Hello, world' test.


```

Downloading six-1.11.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl
Building wheels for collected packages: tornado, configparser
Running setup.py bdist_wheel for tornado: started
Running setup.py bdist_wheel for tornado: finished with status 'done'
Stored in directory: /root/.cache/pip/wheels/1c/21/02/1cddca31450af92b449ea7c57be653d7aa88ba42c716212c
Running setup.py bdist_wheel for configparser: started
Running setup.py bdist_wheel for configparser: finished with status 'done'
Stored in directory: /root/.cache/pip/wheels/1c/bd/b4/277af3f6c40645661b4cd1d1f26aca0f2e1e9714a1d4cd8
Successfully built tornado configparser
Installing collected packages: six, singledispatch, certifi, backports-abc, tornado, enum34, configparser, mccabe, pyflakes, pycodestyle, flake8
Found existing installation: six 1.8.0
Uninstalling six-1.8.0:
  Successfully uninstalled six-1.8.0
Successfully installed backports-abc-0.5 certifi-2017.11.5 configparser-3.5.0 enum34-1.1.6 flake8-3.5.0 mccabe-0.6.1 pycodestyle-2.3.1 pyflakes-1.6.0
singledispatch-3.4.0.3 six-1.11.0 tornado-4.5.3
$ python -c 'print("Hello, world")'
Hello, world
Job succeeded
  
```

**Why?** A faster, less resource-intensive CI/CD platform that's Kubernetes-native.

# Container Signing


A simplified and automated approach to signing container images






# Managing Container Deployment

- Deployments: Containerized App Configuration as Code
- Whitelist / Blacklist external repos
- Apply runtime security policies
- Validate image signatures
- Monitor for new vulnerabilities
- Trust is temporal: rebuild & redeploy as needed




# Projects isolate applications across teams, groups and departments



# Secure microservices with Service Mesh

## Key Features

- A dedicated network for service to service communications
- Observability and distributed tracing
- Policy-driven security
- Routing rules & chaos engineering
- Powerful visualization & monitoring
- Will be available via OperatorHub



# Observability with Kiali

The screenshot displays the Kiali observability dashboard for the 'bookinfo' namespace. The main area shows a service graph with the following components and connections:

- istio-ingressgateway** (istio-system) connects to **productpage** (v1).
- productpage** (v1) connects to **reviews** (v1, v2, v3).
- reviews** (v1) connects to **details** (v1).
- reviews** (v2) connects to **ratings** (v1, v2).
- reviews** (v3) connects to **ratings** (v1, v2).
- ratings** (v1, v2) connects to **mongodb** (v1).

The right-hand panel provides summary statistics:


- Namespace:** bookinfo (applications, services, workloads)
- Current Graph:** 9 apps, 5 services, 14 edges
- HTTP Traffic (requests per second):**

Total	%Success	%Error
3.68	100.00	0.00
- HTTP - Total Request Traffic min / max:** RPS: 3.60 / 3.60, %Error 0.00 / 0.00
- TCP - Total Traffic - min / max:**
  - Sent: 143.00 / 143.00 B/s
  - Received: 115.67 / 115.67 B/s

# Application API management

Consider configuring an API gateway for container platform & application APIs

- Authentication and authorization
- LDAP integration
- End-point access controls
- Rate limiting



# Smarter Software Updates

## No downtime for well behaving apps

Applications with multiple replicas, using liveness probes, health checks and taints/tolerations

Node Pools with more than one worker and slack resources

## Maintenance window for entire cluster


No need for separate windows for each component

## Upgrade runs completely on the cluster

No more long running processes on a workstation


## Constant health checking from each Operator

Operators are constantly looking for incompatibilities and issues that might arise



# GitOps with ArgoCD Guide

- Guide published to GitHub  
[github.com/openshift/openshift-gitops-examples](https://github.com/openshift/openshift-gitops-examples)
- Topics
  - Install and configuration of ArgoCD
  - Cluster configs with ArgoCD
  - Operator installation
  - Multi-cluster configs



The screenshot shows the Argo CD Operator page in the OpenShift console. At the top, there is a header with the Argo CD logo, the text "Argo CD", and "0.0.6 provided by Argo CD Community". Below this is a blue "Install" button. The main content area is divided into several sections: "Operator Version" (0.0.6), "Capability Level" (Basic Install, Seamless Upgrades, Full Lifecycle, Deep Insights, Auto Pilot), "Provider Type" (Community), "Provider" (Argo CD Community), and "Repository" (https://github.com/argopr). A light blue box highlights the "Community Operator" section, which includes a warning about community operators and a link to Red Hat's third party software support policy. An "Overview" section at the bottom describes the operator's goal and its capabilities.

**Argo CD**  
0.0.6 provided by Argo CD Community

[Install](#)

**Operator Version**  
0.0.6

**Capability Level**

- Basic Install
- Seamless Upgrades
- Full Lifecycle
- Deep Insights
- Auto Pilot

**Provider Type**  
Community

**Provider**  
Argo CD Community


**Repository**  
<https://github.com/argopr>

**Community Operator**  
This is a community provided operator. These are operators which have not been vetted or verified by Red Hat. Community Operators should be used with caution because their stability is unknown. Red Hat provides no support for Community Operators.  
[Learn more about Red Hat's third party software support policy](#)

**Overview**  
The Argo CD Operator manages the full lifecycle for [Argo CD](#) and it's components. The operator's goal is to automate the tasks required when operating an [Argo CD](#) deployment.  
Beyond installation, the operator helps to automate the process of upgrading, backing up and restoring as needed and remove the human as much as possible. In addition, the operator aims to provide deep insights into the [Argo CD](#) environment by configuring Prometheus and Grafana to aggregate, visualize and expose the metrics already exported by [Argo CD](#).  
The operator aims to provide the following, and is a work in progress.

# REQUIREMENT 7 & 8

Restrict access by need to know  
Identity and access management






## Requirement 7 & 8: Restrict access by need to know, IAM

### 7. Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know

7.1 Limit access to system components and cardholder data to only those who need to know

7.2 Establish an access control system for system components; default to deny all


7.3 Ensure that security policies and procedures are documented and in use (Git Ops, Compliance operator)



### 8. Identify and authenticate access to system components

## Requirement 7 & 8 Applicability

- Use OpenShifts built-in RBAC, projects and network policies to isolate users, teams and applications from each other
- Use a 3rd party, external identity provider (integrate via LDAP or OAuth)
- Manage account lockouts, session timeouts, via external IdP (can manage session timeouts in OpenShift)



# Identity and access management

OpenShift includes an OAuth server, which does three things:

- Identifies the person requesting a token, using a configured identity provider
  - Determines a mapping from that identity to an OpenShift user
  - Issues an OAuth access token which authenticates that user to the API
- [Managing Users and Groups in OpenShift](#)  
[Configuring Identity Providers](#)

Supported Identity Providers include

- Keystone
- LDAP
- GitHub
- GitLab
- GitHub Enterprise (new with 3.11)
- Google
- OpenID Connect
- Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) to support SSO flows on Windows (Kerberos)

# Restrict access by need to know

## Role based authorization

- Project scope & cluster scope available
- Matches request attributes (verb,object,etc)
- If no roles match, request is denied ( deny by default )
- Operator- and user-level roles are defined by default
- Custom roles are supported





Figure 12 - Authorization Relationships

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**Argo CD**  
0.0.6 provided by Argo CD Community

Install

**Operator Version**  
0.0.6

**Capability Level**

- Basic Install
- Seamless Upgrades
- Full Lifecycle
- Deep Insights
- Auto Pilot

**Provider Type**  
Community

**Provider**  
Argo CD Community

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# REQUIREMENT 10

Track and monitor all access



# Requirement 10: Track and Monitor all access

10.1 Implement audit trails to link system actions to users

10.2 Implement automated audit trails to monitor

10.2.1 All individual user access to card data

10.2.2 All actions taken by privileged users


10.2.3 Access to audit trails

10.2.4 Invalid logical access attempts

10.2.5 Use of and changes to identity and authentication methods

10.2.6 Initializing, stopping, pausing of audit logs

10.2.7 Creation and deletion of system level objects



10.3 Record user identity, type of event, date and time of event, success or failure, origin of event, identity or name of target of event

10.4 Use time synchronization technology

10.5 Secure audit trails so they cannot be altered

# Requirement 10 Applicability

- Host level and API server audit is on by default
- Evaluate default audit levels
- Forward all logs, including audit logs, to SIEM








# Cluster monitoring

## Cluster monitoring is installed by default

- Exposes resource metrics for Horizontal Pod Autoscaling (HPA) by default
  - HPA based on custom metric is tech preview
- No manual etcd monitoring configuration anymore
- New screens for managing Alerts & Silences
- More metrics available for troubleshooting purposes (e.g. HAproxy)
- Configuration via ConfigMaps and Secrets



The screenshot displays the Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform Alerts page. The left sidebar shows the navigation menu with 'Alerts' selected. The main content area shows a summary of alerts: 12 Firing, 0 Silenced, 0 Pending, and 77 Not Firing. Below this is a table of alerts with columns for Name, State, and Firing time.

NAME ↑	STATE
<b>AL CPUThrottlingHigh</b> 39% throttling of CPU in namespace metering-demo for container tiller in pod metering-operator-5c9c754b85-19ds2.	<b>Firing</b> Since  Apr 29, 11:52
<b>AL CPUThrottlingHigh</b> 28% throttling of CPU in namespace metering-demo for container reporting-operator in pod reporting-operator-6c666b88db-qvbb5.	<b>Firing</b> Since  May 2, 6:47 a
<b>AL CPUThrottlingHigh</b> 81% throttling of CPU in namespace metering-demo for container metering-operator in pod metering-operator-5c9c754b85-19ds2.	<b>Firing</b> Since  Apr 29, 11:52
<b>AL KubeDeploymentReplicasMismatch</b> Deployment openshift-operators/mongodb-enterprise-operator has not matched the expected number of replicas for longer than an hour.	<b>Firing</b> Since  May 2, 1:34 p
<b>AL KubePodCrashLooping</b> Pod openshift-operators/mongodb-enterprise-operator-7b6954d84d-g69b4 (mongodb-enterprise-operator) is restarting 0.02 times / 1.5 minutes	<b>Firing</b> Since  Apr 29, 2:52

# Ingress Access Logging

- There is a new API field on the IngressController resource to configure it:
  - Ability to enable access logs
  - Choice of logging to a pod container or to a Syslog server
  - Options to configure HTTP log format and Syslog facility
  - *Limitation:* Syslog endpoint must be UDP
- Log the hostname of a node from which the log message originated (send-log-hostname) enabled




Log to Sidecar Container	<pre>\$ oc -n openshift-ingress-operator patch ingresscontroller/default --type=merge --patch='{"spec":{"logging":{"access":{"destination":{"type":"Container"}}}}}'</pre>
Log to a "facility" on a Syslog server	<pre>\$ oc -n openshift-ingress-operator patch ingresscontroller/default --type=merge --patch='{"spec":{"logging":{"access":{"destination":{"type":"Syslog","syslog":{"address":"1.2.3.4","port":10514,"facility":"audit"}}}}}}'</pre>
View the Logs	<pre>\$ oc -n openshift-ingress logs deploy/router-default -c logs --tail=10 --follow</pre>

# Auditd

- Low level system wide auditing system
- Integrated in Kernel and userspace - no security event escapes!
- Very detailed feed that meets all existing compliance standards
- Actively used by customers that need to adhere to tight security practices
- Auditd is included in RHEL CoreOS
- Host level audit logs are collected for forwarding by the OpenShift Logging Pipelines feature

# SUMMARY



# A comprehensive approach to securing containers and Kubernetes

## Detect

### Trusted Content

- RH supply chain (backport fixes)
- RH Trusted Content with Health Index
- Universal Base Images
- Runtime images

### Private Registry

- Integrated registry
- Quay with Clair for image scanning

### Build Management

- Source2Image
- ImageStreams track changes to external images

### Pipelines & developer tools

- IDE plugins for dependency analysis
- Code Ready Workspaces
- Jenkins / Tekton Pipelines

## Protect

### Configuration & Lifecycle Management

- OpenShift operators manage drift
- OLM manages operator privileges
- One maintenance window for the full stack
- Upgrades with zero application downtime
- Automate Compliance

### Identity and Access Management

- Built-in token based authentication
- Supports 9 Identity Providers including AD/LDAP
- RBAC with Multi-Level Access Control

### Platform Data Protection

- Encrypt secrets at rest (etcd datastore)
- All traffic to master nodes is encrypted by default; x.509 certificates for authentication
- Configure cipher suites

### Deployment Policies

- SCC (Security Context Constraints)
- No privileged containers by default

## Respond

### Container isolation

- RHCOS Immutable user space
- SELinux+
- Secure boot
- LUKS volume encryption / FIPS mode
- Non-root containers

### Network Isolation

- Ingress / Egress control
- Multus CNI plugin
- Network microsegmentation

### Application access and data

- Projects with SELinux annotations control Access to Resources
- Encrypt east / west traffic (Service Mesh)

### Observability

- Host and K8s event audit on by default
- Monitoring on by default
- Applications can use cluster monitoring
- Service Mesh traceability
- Container Security Operator

# Thank you

Red Hat is the world's leading provider of enterprise open source software solutions. Award-winning support, training, and consulting services make Red Hat a trusted adviser to the Fortune 500.



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


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# DEFEND INFRASTRUCTURE





# Day 2 Configuration

## Global Configuration

You complete most of the cluster configuration and customization after you deploy your OpenShift Container Platform cluster.


## Change via Cluster Settings screen

Once you have discovered your desired settings (prev. slide), changes can be made via Console or CLI.

## Operators apply these updates

One or more Operators are responsible for propagating these settings through the infrastructure


- Identity Provider
- Ingress Controller
- Logging, Metrics




# Attached storage

Secure storage by using

- SELinux access controls
- Secure mounts
- Supplemental group IDs for shared storage
- Network bound disk encryption



# EXTEND SECURITY



# The Security Ecosystem

For enhanced security, or to meet existing policies, you may choose to integrate with enterprise security tools, such as

- Identity and Access management / Privileged Access Management
- External Certificate Authorities
- External Vaults / Key Management solutions
- Filesystem encryption tools
- Container content scanners & vulnerability management tools
- Container runtime analysis tools
- Security Information and Event Monitoring (SIEM)

# Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management

# Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes


Robust, proven, award-winning



Multicluster  
life-cycle  
management



Policy-driven  
governance, risk,  
and compliance



Advanced application  
life-cycle management

# Advanced Cluster Management

## Application-centric Management


Deploy, upgrade, and manage applications with consistency across multiple clouds

## Policy-Based Governance


Enforce policies and ensure compliance across clusters, applications and infrastructures

## Cluster Lifecycle Management


Centrally, create, update, delete clusters across the enterprise



Multicloud  
Management



Infrastructure  
Management



Application  
Management



Event  
Management



Existing Tools  
& Processes



Security &  
Compliance  
Management

# Multi-Cluster Management and Security with Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes

- Centrally set & enforce policies for security, applications, & infrastructure
- Quickly visualize detailed auditing on configuration of apps and clusters
- Built-in CIS compliance policies and audit checks
- Immediate visibility into your compliance posture based on your defined standards

The image displays the Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes (ACM) dashboard. At the top, there are four status indicators: 3 Policy Violations, 1 Cluster Violation, 1 High Severity Finding, and 1 Medium Severity Finding. Below this, the 'Top violations' section lists three items: 'policy-cis', 'policy-gc', and 'policy-role', each with a 'rating: 2'. A 'Top security findings' section shows a 'Policy violation finding' with a 'rating: 0'. A 'compliancePolicy' modal is open, showing details for 'policy-prod' with fields for Name, Message, Status, and Enforcement. A code editor on the right shows a YAML snippet for a pod selector. The main dashboard area features a 'Welcome, let's get started.' message with a 'Technology preview' note. Below the welcome message are four cards: 'End-to-end visibility', 'Cluster lifecycle', 'Application lifecycle', and 'Governance, Risk, and Compliance'. The 'End-to-end visibility' card mentions system alerts and operational dashboards. The 'Cluster lifecycle' card mentions creating, updating, scaling, and removing clusters. The 'Application lifecycle' card mentions defining business applications with open standards. The 'Governance, Risk, and Compliance' card mentions using policies to automatically configure and maintain consistency of security controls.



# Appendix: External hybrid cloud security guidance

# Securing Kubernetes

## Guidance from the CNCF Kubernetes Security Audit

“ While Kubernetes facilitates high-availability workload deployments, the underlying hosts, components, and environment of a Kubernetes cluster must be configured and managed. This management has a direct impact on the capabilities of the cluster, and affects the behavior of an operator’s composed objects.

With this in mind, the options available for configuring components of Kubernetes often fluctuate significantly in supported versions, and vary in their approach to default settings. This leads to a non-trivial amount of configuration required by an administrator to stand-up a functional cluster for a given workload.

More effort must then be spent maintaining the cluster to abide by these settings, especially when planning and executing upgrades of Kubernetes components.”

[Kubernetes Security Whitepaper](#), Trail of Bits, May 31, 2019

# Securing the container host

## Guidance from NIST

**Use container-specific host OSs instead of general-purpose ones to reduce attack surfaces.**


A container-specific host OS is a minimalist OS explicitly designed to only run containers, with all other services and functionality disabled, and with read-only file systems and other hardening practices employed. When using a container-specific host OS, attack surfaces are typically much smaller than they would be with a general-purpose host OS, so there are fewer opportunities to attack and compromise a container-specific host OS. Accordingly, whenever possible, organizations should use container-specific host OSs to reduce their risk.

[NIST Special Publication 800-190](#)

Application Container Security Guide

# Securing cloud native workloads

## Guidance from Gartner



“The best way to secure these rapidly changing and short-lived workloads is to start their protection proactively in the development phase ... so that when a workload is instantiated in production, it is “born” protected.”

“Replace antivirus (AV)-centric strategies with a “zero-trust execution”/default deny/application control approach to workload protection where possible...”<sup>1</sup>

# Appendix: Resource management

# Resource & Cluster Capacity Management

- Manage compute resources, object counts, storage resources
  - [Resource quotas per project](#)
  - [Resource quotas across multiple projects](#)
- [OpenShift Cluster Capacity Tool](#)
  - Simulate a sequence of scheduling decisions to determine how many instances of an input pod can be scheduled on the cluster before it is exhausted of resources

Table 1. Compute resources managed by quota

Resource Name	Description
<code>cpu</code>	The sum of CPU requests across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value. <code>cpu</code> and <code>requests.cpu</code> are the same value and can be used interchangeably.
<code>memory</code>	The sum of memory requests across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value. <code>memory</code> and <code>requests.memory</code> are the same value and can be used interchangeably.
<code>ephemeral-storage</code>	The sum of local ephemeral storage requests across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value. <code>ephemeral-storage</code> and <code>requests.ephemeral-storage</code> are the same value and can be used interchangeably. This resource is available only if you enabled the ephemeral storage technology preview. This feature is disabled by default.
<code>requests.cpu</code>	The sum of CPU requests across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value. <code>cpu</code> and <code>requests.cpu</code> are the same value and can be used interchangeably.
<code>requests.memory</code>	The sum of memory requests across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value. <code>memory</code> and <code>requests.memory</code> are the same value and can be used interchangeably.
<code>requests.ephemeral-storage</code>	The sum of ephemeral storage requests across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value. <code>ephemeral-storage</code> and <code>requests.ephemeral-storage</code> are the same value and can be used interchangeably. This resource is available only if you enabled the ephemeral storage technology preview. This feature is disabled by default.
<code>limits.cpu</code>	The sum of CPU limits across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value.
<code>limits.memory</code>	The sum of memory limits across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value.
<code>limits.ephemeral-storage</code>	The sum of ephemeral storage limits across all pods in a non-terminal state cannot exceed this value.

# Descheduler

**Evict a running Pod** so that the Pod can be **rescheduled** onto a more suitable node.

## Situations when to use:

Nodes are underutilized or overutilized

Pod and node affinity requirements, such as taints or labels, have changed and the original scheduling decisions are no longer appropriate for certain nodes.

Node failure requires Pods to be moved.

New nodes are added to clusters.

<https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.4/nodes/scheduling/nodes-descheduler.html#nodes-descheduler>

Install the **descheduler** via **OperatorHub** to the `openshift-kube-descheduler-operator` namespace and Create a `descheduler` instance

```
apiVersion: operator.openshift.io/v1beta1
kind: KubeDescheduler
metadata:
  name: cluster
  namespace: openshift-kube-descheduler-operator
spec:
  deschedulingIntervalSeconds: 3600
  strategies:
    - name: "LowNodeUtilization"
      params:
        - name: "cputhreshold"
          value: "10"
        - name: "memorythreshold"
          value: "20"
        - name: "podsthreshold"
          value: "30"
        - name: "memorytargetthreshold"
          value: "40"
        - name: "cputargetthreshold"
          value: "50"
        - name: "podstargetthreshold"
          value: "60"
        - name: "nodes"
          value: "3"
          - name: "RemoveDuplicates"
```

# Nodes Resource views

## At-a-glance views for your nodes right from the OpenShift Console.

- Key node data surfaced in the **List view**
- Offers a **new Overview** to provide **insights into critical data** back to you
  - Role/Type/Zone/Address
  - Status/Health Checks
  - Resource Utilizations
    - CPU/Memory/Filesystem
- Directly access to your node with a new **Terminal** view right in the console
  - Act as **root** on the node
  - Access Node Logs (journalctl)

The screenshot displays the OpenShift Console interface. At the top, the 'Nodes' page is visible, showing a table of nodes. The table has columns for Name, Status, Role, Pods, Memory, CPU, Filesystem, and Created. Two nodes are listed: one 'Ready' and one 'Not Ready'.

Below the table, the 'Node Details' view for the 'Ready' node is shown. It includes tabs for Overview, Details, YAML, Pods, Events, and Terminal. The 'Overview' tab is active, displaying node information such as Node Name, Role, Instance Type, Zone, and Node Addresses. A 'Health Checks' section shows 'Not configured'. A 'Utilization' section shows CPU and Memory usage. A 'Terminal' view is also visible, showing a shell prompt 'sh-4.2#'.

Name	Status	Role	Pods	Memory	CPU	Filesystem	Created
ip-10-0-131-66.us-east-2.compute.internal	Ready	worker	55	2.74 GiB / 7.78 GiB	0.674 cores	64.36 GiB / 486.2 GiB	May 7, 5:17 am
ip-10-0-132-71.us-east-2.compute.internal	Not Ready	worker	-	-	-	-	May 7, 6:53 am

Resource	Usage	13:45	14:15
CPU	443.5m / 1.5 total limit	1.5 / 1.5	500m
Memory	2.69 GiB / 5.1 GiB available / 1.16 GiB total limit	4 GiB / 2 GiB	2.66 GiB / 1.16 GiB available / 3.01 GiB total limit



# Vertical Pod Autoscaler

The **VPA** can determine the the **right size for pods** and **frees** the user from having to set **pod resource requests and limits**.

## Three controllers:

**Recommender** - Recommends values for cpu and memory requests based on past consumption

**Updater** - Kills pods where VPA recommendations do not match the current settings so that they can be recreated by their controllers with the updated requests.

**Admission Plugin** - Sets the correct resource requests on new pods (due to Updater's activity).

The Vertical Pod Autoscaler Operator is managed by the Cluster Version Operator (CVO) and creates the openshift-vertical-pod-autoscaler namespace


```
apiVersion: autoscaling.openshift.io/v1
kind: VerticalPodAutoscalerController
metadata:
  name: default
spec:
  safetyMarginFraction: 0.15
  podMinCPUMillicores: 25
  podMinMemoryMb: 250
```

# Appendix: Etcd encryption & cipher suites

# OpenShift 4 etcd Encryption

## Encrypt secrets, config maps...

- Encryption of the etcd datastore is optional. Once enabled, encryption cannot be disabled.
- The aes-cbc cipher is used.
- Keys are created and automatically rotated by an operator and stored on the master node's file system.
- Keys are available as a secret via the kube API to a cluster admin.
- Assuming a healthy cluster: after enabling encryption, within a day, all relevant items in etcd are encrypted
- Backup: The etcd data store should be backed up separately from the file system with the key.
- Disaster recovery: a backup of both the encrypted etcd data and encryption keys must be available.



# Ingress & API Cipher Suite Configuration

- Allow customers to meet policies requiring them to use specific cipher suites and/or to ensure that disallowed ciphers are not available.
- The TLSSecurityProfile defines the schema for a TLS security profile that will be used by Ingress and the API server.
- Type is one of Old, Intermediate, or Custom. The Modern profile is currently not supported because it is not yet well adopted by common software libraries.

```
// custom is a user-defined TLS security profile. Be extremely careful using a custom
// profile as invalid configurations can be catastrophic. An example custom profile
// looks like this:
//
//   ciphers:
//     - ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305
//     - ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305
//     - ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
//     - ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
//   minTLSVersion: TLSv1.1
//
// +optional
// +nullable
Custom *CustomTLSProfile `json:"custom,omitempty"`
```